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Abstract. The construction of computational cognitive models integrating the
connectionist and symbolic paradigms of artificial intelligence is a standing re-
search issue in the field. The combination of logic-based inference and connec-
tionist learning systems may lead to the construction of semantically sound com-
putational cognitive models in artificial intelligence, computer and cognitive sci-
ences. Over the last decades, results regarding the computation and learning of
classical reasoning within neural networks have been promising. Nonetheless,
there still remains much do be done. Artificial intelligence, cognitive and com-
puter science are strongly based on several non-classical reasoning formalisms,
methodologies and logics. In knowledge representation, distributed systems, hard-
ware design, theorem proving, systems specification and verification classical
and non-classical logics have had a great impact on theory and real-world ap-
plications. Several challenges for neural-symbolic computation are pointed out,
in particular for classical and non-classical computation in connectionist systems.
We also analyse myths about neural-symbolic computation and shed new light on
them considering recent research advances.
Keywords. Connectionist non-classical logics, neural-symbolic computation, non-
classical reasoning, computational cognitive models.
1 Introduction
The construction of computational cognitive models integrating the connectionist and
symbolic paradigms of artificial intelligence is a standing research issue in the field
[1,2,3,4,5]. These models may lead to more effective and richer cognitive computational
models, and to a better understanding of the computational processes and techniques of
artificial intelligence, with benefits to computer and cognitive sciences. Several efforts
have been made in this direction. However, most of them deal with symbolic knowledge
expressed as production rules or logic programming [6,7,8]. Recently, several research
? Usually, this research area is referred to as neural-symbolic integration. However, I see inte-
gration as a methodology of neural-symbolic computation. If our aim is to construct computa-
tional models and technologies, I would prefer to name the area as Neural-Symbolic Compu-
tation.
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results have shown how to offer richer knowledge representation, reasoning, and learn-
ing by means of non-classical computation in neural-symbolic systems [9,10,11,12].
This is an important development, since non-classical logics and models have offered
solid foundations for computer science, including contributions to the basis of model
checking, system specification and verification, reasoning in multi-agent and distributed
systems and knowledge representation [13,14,15].
In addition, the construction of effective computational cognitive models has re-
cently been pointed out by Valiant as great challenge for computing and cognitive sci-
ences [16]. Further, the UK Computing Research Committee (UKCRC) and the British
Computer Society have organised since 2002 an ambitious research enterprise which
identified challenges that may lead to long-term positive effects not only for computer
science, but also for neural-symbolic computation research [17], as we shall see in the
sequel.
At least two of the grand challenges in computing research listed in [17] are partic-
ularly relevant to neural-symbolic computation research. It is expected over the next
decades that studies on the architecture of brains and minds and journeys in non-
classical computation [17] shall encourage researchers to think about long term prospects
for their research fields. We summarise those two challenges.
As regards the first challenge, [17] state that many processes in our brains and minds
have not yet been fully understood, including the way humans: (i) see many kinds of
things around them; (ii) understand language tasks, such as reading comprehension;
(iii) learn new concepts; (iv) decide what to do; (v) control their actions; (vi) remember
things; (vii) enjoy or dislike things; (viii) become aware of their thoughts and emotions;
(ix) learn about and take account of the mental states of others; (x) appreciate music
and jokes; and (xi) sense the passage of time. Further, [17] state that in order to suc-
cessfully achieve the goals of this project, major breakthroughs are needed, including
research efforts in computer science and artificial intelligence. Such efforts include the
development of “techniques for specifying and implementing many kinds of abstract
mechanisms and processes in present and future physical machines” [17] . The aims
of the project are ambitious and we believe that neural-symbolic computation can con-
tribute to its success. The following quote summarises the purpose and desires of the
challenge:
Inspired by both past and future advances in neuroscience, the project will at-
tempt to build machines that simulate as much as is known about how brain
mechanisms work. In parallel with that, the project will attempt to implement
many kinds of abstract mental processes and mechanisms in physical machines,
initially without requiring biological realism in the implementation mecha-
nisms, but gradually adding more realism as our understanding increases. [17]
As for the second grand challenge listed above, namely journeys in non-classical
computation neural-symbolic computation, in particular connectionist non-classical log-
ics [5] can also offer useful methods and computational constructions towards reaching
the grand challenge research objectives. Computer science has been a successful hu-
man endeavour. Its foundations are based on mathematical abstractions implemented
in physical constructions or devices. The classical theory of computation is based on
logics, algorithms and mathematical abstractions assuming underlying Turing Machine
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models. However, such abstractions have physical embodiments which are reaching
physical limits. As we reach the limits foretold by Gordon Moore in the sixties, alter-
natives are needed, if computer science is to continue being a successful science with
further far-reaching technological implications. The following quote summarises this
grand challenge.
Today’s computing, classical computing, is a remarkable success story. How-
ever, there is a growing appreciation that it encompasses only a small subset
of all computational possibilities. There are several paradigms that seem to
define classical computing, but these may not be valid for all computation.
As these paradigms are systematically challenged, the subject area is widened
and enriched. The Grand Challenge Journeys in Non-classical Computation is
nothing less than a reconceptualization of computation.[17]
Non-classical connectionist models may shed some light on this challenge as well.
Such models are built upon non-classical logics and abstractions implemented on a bi-
ologically inspired (although not necessarily biologically plausible) computing device.
Although incipient, this new approach may well lead to models which will impact in the
development of future technologies. They may offer a computational engine inspired in
the way the brain works, being noise-tolerant and robust. This may lead to hardware
implementations that could overcome the current limitations of the von Neumann ar-
chitectures, drawing inspiration from on biological models of the brain, with respect to
computation, learning and memory models. This would integrate both challenges from
a connectionist non-classical model perspective.
All this sets the scene for neural-symbolic computation with respect to the grand
challenges for computing research. However, we shall present some domain specific
challenges that may contribute for neural-symbolic computation towards reaching more
ambitious objectives.
The approach I use in the paper avoids technical details, but tries to offer a bird’s
eye view of current research in the field. The paper is organised as follows. First, we in-
troduce the basics of non-classical connectionist computation. We then present research
challenges and lay some myths of neural-symbolic computation on the line.
2 Preliminaries: A Taste of Connectionist Non-Classical Models
This section introduces the basics of connectionist models and non-classical connec-
tionist models used in this article. The specialist reader can skip this section.
We assume familiarity with neural networks models and only summarise used con-
cepts. A neural network can be seen as a massively parallel distributed processor that
stores experiential knowledge [18]. A multilayer perceptron (MLP) is composed of sev-
eral layers of simple processing units, the artificial neurons. Typically, neural-symbolic
systems use some simple network model to compute and learn symbolic knowledge.
In particular, there are several methods for representing time and symbolic knowledge
in MLPs. In [9] a parallel representation of time is considered, using an ensemble of
MLPs, where each network represents a specific timepoint. But before going into fur-
ther detail, let us briefly describe the distinction between classical and non-classical
reasoning.
4 L.C. Lamb
In order to illustrate the difference between classical and non-classical logics let
us consider temporal logic as described in [19]. Let us regard the assignment of truth-
values to the propositions as being a description of the world or situation with respect to
a particular time t. In temporal logic, the value assigned to a proposition (statement) can
vary with the flow of time. This is not the case in classical logics: once a statement (a
proposition) is proved its truth-value is definite. However, in artificial intelligence and
computer science, as opposed to classical mathematics, time is an extremely relevant
dimension as we are frequently working with several states, statements about particu-
lar timepoints or intervals, and several interpretations of these states. Under a modal
interpretation of time, one could refer to the truth-values of a proposition in a linear
timeline (considering both past and future), a branching time interpretation with sev-
eral futures using modalities such as always true in future/past, sometimes true in the
future/past among several other possibilities. This turns temporal logic into an expres-
sive non-classical logical systems, which perhaps explains the success of this logic in
computer science, artificial intelligence and cognitive science [12,13,20,21,22,23].
It is now common knowledge that modal logics have become one of the outstand-
ing logical languages used in computer science from theoretical foundations [13,15] to
state-of-the-art hardware [14] and multi-agent technologies [22]. The toolbox of any AI
researcher now includes modal logics, as they were found appropriate for researches
in several areas of AI. Areas such as knowledge representation, planning and theo-
rem proving also have been making extensive use of modal logics, be they temporal,
epistemic, conditional, intuitionistic, doxastic or many-dimensional modal logics, in-
cluding, for instance, combinations of time and knowledge, time and belief, or space
and time, to name a few [13,15,24].
In order to represent rich non-classical, symbolic knowledge in connectionist mod-
els, such as modal and temporal knowledge (which have been shown adequate in mod-
elling multi-agent cognition [22]), one typically makes use of a hybrid approach, trans-
lating symbolic knowledge into a neural network, e.g. [6,9,12]. For instance, the tempo-
ral knowledge representation language either consider fragments of logic programming
or extensions of logic programming clauses, including modalities or temporal operators
[9,10,11].
To respond to the challenge put forward in [16], we have incorporated in a sin-
gle model the two fundamental aspects of intelligent behaviour, namely reasoning and
learning. We have applied the model in reasoning about distributed knowledge rep-
resentation benchmarks [9,25], intuitionistic reasoning [10], temporal synchronisation
and learning [12]. Thus, the following logic definitions shall be useful, as we shall use
temporal reasoning to analyse the effectiveness of neural-symbolic computation.
Definition 1. An atom A is a propositional variable; a literal L is an atom A or a
negation of an atom (∼ A). A clause is an implication of the form A ← L1, L2, ..., Ln
with n ≥ 0, where A is an atom and Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are literals. A program P is a set of
clauses. An interpretation of a program P is a mapping from each atom of a program to
a truth value true or false. The Immediate Consequence Operator TP of a program P is
a mapping from an interpretation IP of P to another interpretation, and is defined as:TP(IP)(A) is true if and only if there is a clause in P of the form A← L1, L2, ..., Ln and∧n
i=1 IP(Li) is true.
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Definition 2. A modal atom is of the form MA where M ∈ {,^} and A is an atom. A
modal literal is of the form ML where L is a literal.
Definition 3. A modal program is a finite set of clauses of the form αn+1 ← α1∧ ...∧αn,
where αi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is either an atom or a modal atom, and αn+1 is an atom.
Let us start with a simple example. It briefly illustrates how Connectionist Modal Logics
(CML) can be used for modelling non-classical reasoning.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows an ensemble of three CILP [6] neural networks labelled
as (ω1, ω2, ω3), which might communicate in many different ways. Input and output
neurons may represent the modalities L, ^L, or L, where L is a literal. The idea is
to see ω1, ω2 and ω3 as possible worlds, and to represent and compute modalities in
neural networks. For example, (i) “If ω1 : A then ω2 : A”; i.e. if at the possible world
ω1 (here representing a neuron) we have A true, then A could be communicated from
ω1 to ω2 by connecting A in ω1 to A in ω2 such that, whenever A is activated in
ω1, A is activated in ω2. Similarly, (ii) “If (ω2 : A) ∨ (ω3 : A) then ω1 : ^A” could
be implemented by connecting neurons A of ω2 and ω3 to neuron ^A of ω1 through a
number of hidden neurons. Examples (i) and (ii) simulate, in a finite universe, the rules
of  Elimination and^ Introduction used in natural deduction style proof systems [13].
The representation of modalities in neural networks is described in detail in [5,11].
2.1 Connectionist Temporal Logics of Knowledge
Connectionist Temporal Logic of Knowledge CTLK [9] uses ensembles of Connection-
ist Inductive Learning and Logic Programming (CILP) neural networks [6,26]. CILP
networks are single hidden layer networks that can be trained with backpropagation
[27]. In CILP, a Translation Algorithm maps a temporal logic program P into a single
hidden layer neural network N such that N computes the least fixed-point of P. Let us
illustrate the approach by presenting a simple example.
Example 2. (Next Time Operator) When combining temporal and epistemic logics,
one has to define temporal and epistemic operators. Both are modal operators. The Ki
modality is known as the knowledge operator. Kiα means that agent i knows α, where α
is some propositional formula. One of the typical axioms of temporal logics of knowl-
edge is Ki © α → ©Kiα [28], where © denotes the next time temporal operator. This
means that what an agent i knows today (Ki) about tomorrow (©α), she still knows to-
morrow (©Kiα). In other words, this axiom states that an agent does not forget what she
knew. This can be represented in an ensemble of neural networks with the use of a net-
work that represents the agent’s knowledge today, a network that represents the agent’s
knowledge tomorrow, and the appropriate connections between networks. Clearly, an
output neuron K©α of a network that represents agent i at time t needs to be connected
to an output neuron Kα of a network that represents agent i at time t + 1 in such a
way that, whenever K©α is activated, Kα is also activated. This is illustrated in Fig.
2, where the black circle denotes a neuron that is always activated, and the activation
value of output neuron K©α is propagated to output neuron Kα. Weights must be such
that Kα is also activated.
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Fig. 1. Modal reasoning in connectionist models
Generally speaking, the idea behind a connectionist temporal logic is to have (instead
of a single ensemble) a number n of ensembles, each representing the knowledge held
by a number of agents at a given time point t. Figure 2 illustrates how this dynamic
feature can be combined with the symbolic features of the knowledge represented in
each network, allowing not only the analysis of the current state (possible world or time
point), but also the analysis of how knowledge changes through time.
In order to reason over time and represent knowledge evolution, we combine Tem-
poral Logic Programming [29] and the knowledge operator Ki into a Connectionist
Temporal Logic of Knowledge (CTLK). The implementation of Ki is analogous to that
of ; we treat Ki as a universal modality as done in [15].
Definition 4. (Connectionist Temporal Logic) The language of CTLK contains:
1. A set {p, q, r, ...} of primitive propositions;
2. A set of agentsA = {1, ..., n};
3. A set of connectives Ki (i ∈ A), where Ki p reads agent i knows p;
4. The temporal operator© (next time); and
5. A set of extended modal logic clauses of the form t : MLn+1 ← ML1, ...,MLn,
where t is a label representing a discrete time point in which the associated clause
holds, M ∈ {,^}, and L j (1 ≤ j ≤ n + 1) is a literal.
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Fig. 2. Temporal reasoning in neural networks
We consider the case of a linear flow of time. As a result, the semantics of CTLK
requires that we build models in which possible states form a linear temporal relation-
ship. Moreover, to each timepoint, we associate the set of formulas holding at that point
by a valuation map. The language used in the example below represents linear temporal
knowledge dealing with both past and future as in [12,20]. Therefore, we need to extend
the syntax of the above formalisation. The unary past operators ,  and  are respec-
tively defined as previous time, always in the past and sometime in the past. Future time
operators ,  and ♦ are also defined. The binary S and Z operators (since and “zince”)
denote that a proposition has been true since the occurrence of another, but αZβ also
allows the case where α has always occurred. The U (until) and W (unless) operators
are defined mirroring S and Z, in the future time.
Definition 5. (Extended Temporal Formulas) An atom is inductively defined as follows:
(i) If p is a propositional variable, then p is an atom; (ii) If α and β are atoms, then α,
α, α, αSβ and αZβ are also atoms; (iii) If α and β are atoms, then α, α, ♦α, αUβ
and αWβ are also atoms.
2.2 Temporal Synchronisation and Learning in Neural-Symbolic Systems
In [12] we have shown that temporal synchronisation and learning can be effectively
comuted in neural-symbolic systems. A sequential approach to temporal reasoning was
used, enabling reasoning and learning about distributed environments in neural net-
works. Consider the following example [12]. We have applied a neural-symbolic ap-
proach to a classical problem of synchronisation in distributed environments, namely,
the Dining Philosophers Problem, originally from [30]: n philosophers sit at a table,
spending their time thinking and eating. In the centre of the table there is a plate of
noodles, and a philosopher needs two forks to eat it. The number of forks on the table
is the same as the number of philosophers. One fork is placed between each pair of
philosophers and they will only use the forks to their immediate right and left. They
never talk to each other, which creates the possibility of deadlock and starvation.
In [12] we have represented the knowledge of each philosopher (agent) using tem-
poral logic programs, and computed their behaviour in the neural-symbolic model. An
agent’s policy will model the following behaviour: from the moment that information
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hungryi is known to agent i, she must start trying to get forks (say, from the left) until
all forks are in use. When an agent has two forks, she may eat until she is sated (i.e.
an external input satedi is applied). An agent can communicate with the environment
through five distinct actions: eati, dropLi and dropRi, representing that the agent is re-
turning a fork (left or right) to the table, and pickLi, pickRi, in which the agent tries to
allocate the left and the right forks. Since a fork may not be available when an agent
tries to pick it, the environment responds to agent i through the information gotLi and
gotRi, denoting that agent i was successfully allocated a fork. The environment ran-
domly sends signals hungry and sated to the agents, and responds to actions performed
by the agents, allowing only one agent to be allocated a particular fork at each time.
Agents do not receive any information about their state (being hungry, holding forks,
etc); they only receive information about individual events and internally represent their
states with respect to these events.
Table 1 illustrates the logic program that represents an agent’s behaviour. The upper
half of the table describes the original knowledge and the lower half describes knowl-
edge translated by a translation algorithm (given in [12]) into a neural network. In order
pickL1WgotL1 ← hungry1; pickR1WgotR1 ← gotL1
eat1Wsated1 ← gotR1; dropL1 ← sated1
dropR1 ← sated1; sated1 ← sated∗1
GotL1 ← GotL∗1
GotR1 ← GotR∗1
pickL1WgotL1 ← (pickL1Wgot1,A),∼ gotL1
pickL1 ← pickL1WgotL1,∼ gotL1
pickR1WgotR1 ← (pickR1WgotR1),∼ gotR1
pickR1 ← pickR1WgotR1,∼ gotR1
eat1Wsated1 ← (eat1Wsated1),∼ sated1
eat1 ← eat1Wsated1,∼ sated1
Table 1. An agent’s temporal knowledge representation
to analyse the learning capacity of the networks representing each agent, we have given
each agent the necessary information so that a supervised learning algorithm could be
used. Such information is the action the agent executes at each timepoint, according
to the default policy, and the agent’s state of affairs (such state is stored in the environ-
ment). Three different configurations have been used in our experiments. The behaviour
of “fully knowledgeable” agents is represented in a network generated by the transla-
tion of all rules in Table 1. This generates a network with layers containing, respectively,
thirteen, fourteen, and eleven neurons. “Partly knowledgeable” agents are represented
by networks generated from the lower part of Table 1, and inserting eight additional
hidden neurons to allow for learning of the other rules with the same number of neu-
rons in the hidden layer (fourteen). All the connections to and from these new neurons
have been randomly initialized. Finally, agents with no knowledge had all connections
randomly set.
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Two learning approaches were considered. First, oﬄine learning was implemented,
where the agent only receives information from the environment, and her actions do
not change the environment. Next, we have carried out online learning, with an agent
acting over the environment during the learning experiments. We have used an envi-
ronment with three agents, where two of them are fully knowledgeable. We have run
three different experiments, varying the knowledge level of the remaining agent. These
learning experiments have shown that an effective cognitive computational model for
integrated temporal learning and reasoning can be built. The experiments have indi-
cated that temporal knowledge can be successfully represented, computed and learned
by connectionist models, and they has illustrated the capabilities of the model’s learn-
ing dimension. In particular, the learning experiments corroborate the benefits of using
symbolic background knowledge in the form of temporal logic rules: agents that make
better use of background knowledge had more effective learning performance. Detailed
results are reported in [12].
The model described above copes with reasoning, learning and synchronisation
in a distributed, multi-agent systems with non-trivial behaviour. However, we believe
that neural-symbolic computation can contribute to computer science if we are able
to achieve several challenges. These challenges are related to mainstream computing
methodology and thought and thus would give neural-symbolic computation a high
stand in the scientific community. Next, we proceed to the challenges ahead of neural-
symbolic computation.
3 Challenges for Neural-Symbolic Systems
In this section we raise several challenges ahead of neural-symbolic computation. They
can also be seen as challenges for computer science, since positive responses would
lead to a number of implications. Such implications could impact the great challenges
of computing research as described above.
3.1 Challenge 1: To Axiomatise Connectionist Non-Classical Logics
Logicians axiomatise logical systems to present subject-matters as formal and coherent
theories, allowing for the deduction of all propositions of a system from a well-defined
set of initial assumptions [31]. Axiomatisations are used to understand proofs from
initial assumptions, to allow the analysis of the complexity and structure of proofs.
Computer scientists axiomatise logic-based theories to better understand the computa-
tional power of their theories, their limitations and relationships with the limits of com-
puting. Notwithstanding several results on representing fragments of logical systems
within neural networks, and computing such fragments, we have not (yet) presented
a systematic axiomatisation of classical and connectionist non-classical systems. The
proposed axiomatisation would have to take into consideration several characteristics
of neural models, including uncertainty, conditional reasoning (i.e. what kind of impli-
cation A → B between formulae A and B we have in neural networks. Is it classical,
conditional [32], causal [33] or probabilistic implication [34]). What kind of negation
do we have in neural networks? Intuitionistic as in [10,35], classical, or negation as
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failure? The forthcoming book [5] promises to shed some light on this, but research is
still needed, as pointed out in [36]. This would be of great benefit to the community,
as we would be able to understand the logical and computational limitations and ex-
pressiveness of logic-based connectionist systems. This is a hard challenge. Axiomatis-
ing a theory of connectionist logics which in principle integrate elements of symbolic
logic (rigid and exact, well-defined over a long history of mathematical rigour) and
neural networks (based on statistical, dynamic and probabilistic models) may demand
the development of new foundations, which might be themselves hybrid combinations
of mathematical techniques. Since we are dealing with the axiomatisation of a form of
computational logic, complexity studies regarding the underlying proposed connection-
ist logical systems are also welcome.
3.2 Challenge 2: To Show that the Benchmark Scenarios are Effectively Tackled
by Neural-Symbolic Computation
In order to respond to this challenge, we might firstly have to axiomatise connectionist
classical and non-classical logics. This would allow the neural-symbolic community to
establish principled comparisons in terms of knowledge representation and (descriptive)
complexity to classical and non-classical logics. In particular, in order to show that the
standard (multi-agent or probabilistic) knowledge representation scenarios presented
in e.g. [15] are effectively solved by neural-symbolic systems, we need to understand
how far neural-symbolic systems go as knowledge representation systems. Related to
this challenge is ontology learning and representation in the semantic web [37] or in
domains where temporal and epistemic dimensions are of relevance, such as cognitive
modelling [38].
3.3 Challenge 3: To Provide a Semantic Foundation for Neural-Symbolic
Computation.
Although several sound translations have been done from fragments of logic program-
ming to connectionist models, in a principled way, we do not have at the moment a well-
defined denotational semantics-style of neural-symbolic computation. I believe that the
challenge can draw inspiration from the challenge the late Christopher Strachey con-
fronted in the 1960’s when trying to use the λ-calculus as a semantic foundation of pro-
gramming languages and systems. It is well-known in the history of computer science
that Dana Scott came to the rescue and warned the programming languages community
that the λ-calculus did not have a model at that time. He then developed such model and
alongside Strachey founded the area of denotational semantics [39,40]
3.4 Challenge 4: Model Checking Cognitive Systems
Model checking [14] has been probably the most successful non-classical logic-based
technology of the last 30 years. It is founded on temporal logics and has been recog-
nised as an essential technology in hardware design. Temporal logics (a form of non-
classical logics [13]) have had so much success in computer science that Amir Pnueli
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was awarded the ACM Turing Award in 1996 for laying its computational foundations
[41], and Edmund Clarke, E. Allen Emerson and Joseph Sifakis - pioneers of its most
prominent application (model checking) - have been awarded the ACM Turing Award in
2007. As non-classical reasoning researchers we strongly believe that model checking
connectionist models may lead to the successful development of applied connectionist
systems. Recently, model checking has been useful in multi-agent systems applications
[42]. We conjecture that model checking connectionist systems may offer us principles
to understand the how such models work, leading to a better understanding of the neural
computation process and providing sound computational models.
3.5 Challenge 5: To Understand the Relationship Between Biological and
Computational Connectionist Models
Most results the neural-symbolic community has published are related to the expres-
siveness, learnability and computational power of artificial neural networks as com-
putational systems. However, there is no proof of the correspondence between artifi-
cial neural network models and biological models. Even though our neural-symbolic
models are biologically motivated, we have not produced definite evidence that they
correspond to natural systems. However, this is not a requirement. What we aim is to
produce effective neural-symbolic models which are useful in real world applications,
and offer a sound theory of computational cognitive systems. Such systems may cor-
respond to natural models, but this is not required. Computer science is about building
effective computational models, that can be of benefit to humankind, be they biologi-
cally motivated, inspired or just mathematical abstractions with no relation to biological
constructions. [43] offers an interesting analysis about the recent trends on biologically
inspired computing, suggesting that one should look not only at biological models, but
to unconventional (non-classical) and novel paradigms.
4 Myths and Achievements of Neural-Symbolic Computation
In this section I present some controversial issues about the limitations of neural-symbolic
computation. However, I also present evidence that several results have weaken these
myths over the last decades. 1
4.1 Myth 1: The Propositional Fixation of Neural-Symbolic Computation
In 1988, McCarthy raised this issue on the note Epistemological challenges for con-
nectionism [45], a published commentary on Smolensky’s On the proper treatment of
connectionism [46]. Propositional fixation assumes that neural networks cannot go be-
yond propositional logic. Several researchers have now addressed this issue, and have
indicated that this is not necessarily the case. Recently, Garcez, Lamb and Gabbay, in
several publications have show that modal and temporal logics (which correspond to the
two-variable fragment of first-order logic [47]) can be effectively represented in neural
1 I draw inspiration from a paper by Hall [44] about the seven myths of formal methods.
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networks [9,10,11,48,49,50]. Bader, Hitzler, Ho¨lldobler, and Witzel have proved that
neural networks can generate models of first-order logic programs [51,52,53]. Several
researchers have also shown that neural-symbolic systems can learn or compute rela-
tions and fragments of first-order logics, see e.g. [54,55,56,57]. These results provide
evidence that the field is maturing in terms of foundational results.
4.2 Myth 2: Neural-Symbolic Systems do Not Work in Practice
This myth has been challenged. Even though neural-symbolic systems are still in its
infancy, they have proved effective learning systems in real world applications. Such
applications have included power systems fault diagnosis, computational biology and
DNA sequence analysis [6,58]. They have also been successfully used as model allow-
ing for integrated learning and computation of arguments, including circular arguments
[59]. Moreover, neural-symbolic systems have allowed for full solutions of standard
testbed for distributed knowledge representation and reasoning about uncertainty, time
and knowledge. For instance, a full solution for the well-known muddy children puzzle
[15] has recently been shown. Connectionist Temporal Logic of Knowledge (CTLK)
[9,25,35] an extension of Connectionist Modal Logics (CML) [11,50] has enabled a
full solution of the testbed, integrating a temporal and an epistemic dimension to the
problem, leading to a full solution of the problem (although one may claim that the
full solution is simple such solution had not been published until 2003). To the best of
our knowledge such solution has been firstly shown by Garcez and Lamb in [25]. The
proposed solution also allows for learning in the system, rendering a computational
cognitive model integrating knowledge representation, reasoning and learning within
neural networks with possible applications in the domains of multi-agent systems and
cognitive modelling [9,5]. It would be interesting, however, to analyse the reasoning
and learning capabilities of neural-symbolic systems in economic multi-agent scenar-
ios such as the minority game [60,61].
4.3 Myth 3: Neural-Symbolic Systems are Not Biologically Plausible
This myth is strongly related to the challenge 3.5 above. Some neural-symbolic systems
draw inspiration from biological models. However, that does not imply that they cor-
respond to biological, natural models of the brain and mind. What we aim at building
are effective computational cognitive models integrating the connectionist and symbolic
paradigms of artificial intelligence. Ideally, such systems will show their effectiveness
in practical applications. We do not necessarily need to build models that correspond
to biological models of a (human) brain. Teuscher [43] raises a relevant issue, provid-
ing evidence and questioning the recent trend in computing: the need for biologically
inspired methods and abstractions. He reminds us that “Trying to cope or mimic life
or lifelike behaviour in all scientific disciplines has generally produced disillusion af-
ter high initial hopes and hype.” Teuscher quotes Conrad [62], one of the pioneers of
bio-inspired computational models: “...no system can be at once highly structurally
programmable, evolutionary efficient and computationally efficient” [62]. In order to
justify the work on neural-symbolic computing, one does not need to prove that one’s
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model is biologically plausible; rather, one has to show that one’s model is compu-
tationally effective, leading to principled scientific results which in turn may lead to
successful technologies.
5 Conclusions
The analysis of the recent grand challenges for computing research [17] provide fur-
ther evidence that neural-symbolic computation may be a promising research endeav-
our. The challenges are certainly not easy to achieve and demand multi-disciplinary
research, including research on non-classical computational models. Neural-symbolic
computation demands knowledge of seemingly incompatible areas, but which can ben-
efit from each other.
Recently, non-classical logics have been shown to be prone to integration with neu-
ral networks. The work reported in [5,9,10,12,20] has indicated that modal, tempo-
ral and (fragments of) non-classical logics knowledge can be successfully represented,
computed and learned by connectionist models. [51,52,53] have show how to compute a
class of first-order programs in connectionist models. These results are relevant in terms
of expressiveness of neural-symbolic computation and may lead to further applications
in real-world scenarios.
Computer science has had a successful history. We believe that the road ahead is
challenging and exciting. The grand challenges suggest that we should look at several
areas to make due progress. Neural-symbolic computation could contribute towards
reaching them. Biology, physics, economics, cognitive and nano sciences are providing
us with new data (and opportunities) to set forth on new computational models that may
lead to ground breaking computational or scientific paradigms.
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